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Abstract In this paper, we analyze the influence of social
status on opinion dynamics and consensus building in
collaboration networks. To that end, we simulate the dif-
fusion of opinions in empirical networks and take into
account both the network structure and the individual dif-
ferences of people reflected through their social status. For
our simulations, we adapt a well-known Naming Game
model and extend it with the Probabilistic Meeting Rule to
account for the social status of individuals participating in a
meeting. This mechanism is sufficiently flexible and allows
us to model various society forms in collaboration net-
works, as well as the emergence or disappearance of social
classes. In particular, we are interested in the way how
these society forms facilitate opinion diffusion. Our
experimental findings reveal that (i) opinion dynamics in
collaboration networks is indeed affected by the individu-
als’ social status and (ii) this effect is intricate and non-
obvious. Our results suggest that in most of the networks
the social status favors consensus building. However,
relying on it too strongly can also slow down the opinion
diffusion, indicating that there is a specific setting for an
optimal benefit of social status on the consensus building.
On the other hand, in networks where status does not
correlate with degree or in networks with a positive degree
assortativity consensus is always reached quickly regard-
less of the status.
Keywords Opinion dynamics  Consensus building 
Collaboration networks  Naming Game
1 Introduction
It is our natural predisposition to interact with people who
have a high social status in our social communities. Cus-
tomarily, our social interactions and, to some extent, our
behavior are influenced by actions of individuals with a
high social status. In the field of social psychology, the
social status theory attempts to explain this phenomenon
(Markovsky et al. 1993; Walker et al. 2000; Willer 1999).
According to it, people tend to form their connections in a
social network to maximize their perceived social benefits
arising from the social status of their connections. Also, in
the work of Guha et al. (2004) the authors relate social
status to the mechanism of link formation in a social net-
work, hypothesizing that people with a lower social status
are more likely to create (directed) links with people of a
higher social status.
In this paper, however, we are not interested in the
relation between the social status and the process of link
formation, but rather in the relation between social status
and dynamical processes that may take place in a social or
collaboration network (i.e., a special case of social net-
work, in which users collaborate). One example of such
dynamical process is a so-called opinion dynamics process.
In our daily lives, we interact with our peers, discuss
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certain problems, exchange opinions and try to reach some
kind of consensus. The question we want to answer in this
paper is how social status influences such processes in a
collaboration network. For example, in a university class
there is a lively discussion between a student and her
mentor regarding their newest experimental results and
their interpretation. The mentor has a higher social status
than the student, due to a superior education, a broader
experience and a higher position in the organizational
hierarchy. Undoubtedly, while trying to reach a consensus,
the student will be influenced by opinions of her mentor
because of the latter’s convincing power (Castellano et al.
2009; Latane´ 1981). The literature (Castellano et al. 2009)
identifies this process as dynamics of agreement/disagree-
ment between persons belonging to a social group. For
clarity, in this paper we will refer to it as opinion dynamics.
1.1 Problem
The aim of this work is to extend our previous investiga-
tions (Hasani-Mavriqi et al. 2015) in respect of the influ-
ence of social status on the process of reaching consensus
within a social community that has a heterogeneous dis-
tribution of social status, by studying the underlying net-
work structure. In particular, we investigate new empirical
networks and construct synthetic networks to analyze the
impact of degree assortativity and the correlation between
degree and social status on opinion dynamics. While there
is a substantial body of work on opinion dynamics (see
Sect. 6) in general settings, we focus on a more specific
and more realistic situation in which the dynamics are
influenced not only by the network structure and the rele-
vant parameters but also by the intrinsic properties of every
single node in the network, such as social status. In other
words, we study the interplay between structure, dynamics
and exogenous node characteristics and how these complex
interactions influence the process of consensus building.
1.2 Approach and methods
In the field of statistical physics (Castellano et al. 2009),
opinion dynamics is commonly studied by applying
mathematical models and analytic approaches. To make
these complex problems tractable for mathematical analy-
sis, researchers make simplifications, such as presenting
opinions as sets of numbers, ignoring the network structure
(a typical approach from e.g., mean-field theory) and
neglecting the individual differences between nodes. Sim-
plifications narrow the scope of research down to theoret-
ical models, which typically do not consider empirical data.
Even so, statistical physics constitutes important basics for
the state-of-the-art research on social dynamics in collab-
oration networks. In this paper, we build upon these basics.
We take a computational approach and analyze opinion
dynamics by simulating the diffusion of opinions in
empirical collaboration networks (specifically, we study
datasets from a Q&A site StackExchange and a co-au-
thorship dataset). In our simulations, we consider the net-
work structure, apply a set of simple rules for opinion
diffusion and take into account people’s individual differ-
ences (e.g., their social status). In particular, we simulate
scenarios of peer interactions in empirical datasets
assuming that the status theory holds and observe the
consequences. We model the dynamics of opinion
spreading by adapting a well-known Naming Game model
(Baronchelli et al. 2006b) and extending it by incorporat-
ing a mechanism to configure the degree of the influence of
social status on the network dynamics. We termed this
mechanism the Probabilistic Meeting Rule. Through
parametrization, we are able to explore various scenarios
from the opposite sides of the spectrum: (i) We can com-
pletely neglect the status by allowing any two individuals
to exchange their opinions regardless of their social status
(an egalitarian society) (Arneson 2013); (ii) we can have
opinions flowing only in one direction—from individuals
with a higher social status to those with a lower social
status (a stratified society) (Weber 1964); (iii) we can
probabilistically model any situation in between these two
extreme cases, that is, a case in which opinions are very
likely to flow from individuals with a higher social status to
those with a lower social status, but with small probability
they can also flow into the other direction (a ranked soci-
ety) (Weber 1964).
1.3 Contributions
The main contributions of our work are twofold. Firstly,
with our paper we contribute to the field of opinion
dynamics methodologically. Secondly, with our work we
also make an empirical contribution.
Our methodological contribution can be summarized as
follows. To model various scenarios of how social status
may influence the opinion dynamics, we have invented the
Probabilistic Meeting Rule (see Sect. 2.2) and extended a
standard Naming Game model with that rule. The exten-
sion is flexible and may reflect a variety of interesting
scenarios, such as the emergence or disappearance of social
classes in collaboration networks. Further, we provide an
initial analysis on how this meeting rule may influence the
consensus building process. This analysis allows us to
obtain an intuition on the possible outcomes of our simu-
lations. The opinion flow between different user groups can
be easily controlled through our computational approach
for parameter estimation (see Sect. 2.3). We also analyze
the influence of network structure, particularly the influ-
ence of degree assortativity, and the correlation between
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degree and status on the process of consensus reaching in
collaboration networks.
From the empirical point of view, wemade amuch-needed
contribution to the limited body of research onNaming Game
and empirical data (Gao et al. 2014) and obtained very
interesting empirical experimental results. For example, based
on the status theory it can be expected that consensus can be
reached faster when social status plays a role. However, our
results only partially confirm this expectation. In particular, if
an opinion flows only in one high- to low-status direction,
opinions do not converge at all since there are always a few
people who do not adopt the common opinion from the net-
work. However, with only a low influence of social status
convergence is reached faster than with no status at all (as in a
standard Naming Game). These results suggest that finding
the optimal process of consensus reaching is a tuning act of
how to integrate social status in the opinion dynamics. In
addition, our investigations on the role of network structure on
opinion dynamics reveal that (i) hubs are important factors for
spreading a single common opinion among other nodes and
(ii) in networkswith a positive assortativity degree or a degree
sequence decorrelated with user’s social status, the consensus
is reached without external intervention.
The StackExchange empirical networks used in our
previous work (Hasani-Mavriqi et al. 2015) are disassor-
tative networks, i.e., they have a negative degree assorta-
tivity coefficient. In disassortative networks, high-degree
nodes are on average connected to nodes with low(er)
degree (Noldus and Mieghem 2015). In this work, we
extend our experiments with an additional type of empiri-
cal network, namely assortative networks, in which phys-
ical connections between low and high agents are very rare.
We turn to co-authorship networks as an example of net-
works that exhibit a positive degree assortativity coeffi-
cient, indicating that, on average, nodes with similar
degrees are connected together.
2 Methodology
2.1 Naming Game
Naming Game (Baronchelli et al. 2005, 2006a, b; Dal-
l’Asta et al. 2006a, b) is a networked agent-based topology,
in which agent-to-agent interactions take place based on
predefined gaming rules. In particular, agents exchange
their opinions and try to reach a consensus about the name
of an unknown object. When all agents in the network
agree on the name, the network is considered to have
established a common opinion.
Agents in the game are represented as nodes of a net-
work, and edges between two agents allow them to interact
with each other. Names are represented with an inventory
of words, and each agent has her own inventory to store the
words. Technically, an inventory is a set (i.e., a bag) of
words. In the initial state, the inventories are empty. Two
random adjacent agents are chosen in each simulation step
to interact through a meeting: One agent is declared as a
speaker and the other as a listener. In the course of the
meeting, the speaker selects a word from her inventory and
communicates it to the listener (note that if the speaker’s
inventory is empty, a new unique word is created and
stored in the inventory). After communicating the word to
the listener, two scenarios are possible (see Fig. 1):
1. the word is not in the listener’s inventory—the word is
added to listener’s inventory,
2. otherwise, both speaker and listener agree on that word
and remove all other words from their inventories—
they agree on the selected word.
2.2 Naming Game and social status
We modify the Naming Game to account for social status.
As before, the agents are represented as network nodes,
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with prob. (1 - psl) 
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Fig. 1 NamingGamemeeting. The classical NamingGame consists of
steps 1, 3 and 4, whereas our extension also includes the step 2. In step 2,
we decide whether the meeting between two agents occurs by
evaluating Probabilistic Meeting Rule (Eq. 1). For illustration, con-
sider a ranked society with stratification factor b ¼ 0:0001.Example 1:
Speaker’s status ss ¼ 101 and listener’s status sl ¼ 7967. The meeting
probability evaluates to psl ¼ 0:45.We then draw a number from [0, 1]
uniformly at random (e.g., 0.93) and compare it with psl—the meeting
does not take place. Example 2: Let ss ¼ 576 and sl ¼ 865, which leads
to the meeting probability psl ¼ 0:97.We again draw a random number
from [0, 1] (e.g., 0.77)—in this case the meeting takes place. If the
meeting takes place, two scenarios are possible. (1) If the speaker
transmits aword (red) that is unknown by the listener, the listener adds it
to her inventory (uptake). (2) If the word chosen by the speaker is also
known to the listener, they both agree on this word. In this case, they
both remove all other words from their inventories and keep only the
transmitted one (agreement) (color figure online)
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edges denote whether two agents can interact or not, and
names (opinions) are represented as word inventories.
The first difference between our model and a standard
Naming Game is the simulation initialization. We initialize
the inventories with a given number of selected words from
a given vocabulary. The words are selected (with
replacement uniformly) at random from the vocabulary.
This results in an initial state where each opinion occurs
with the same probability.
Secondly, we adopt the social status that governs how
agent interactions are turned into meetings—not every
agent interaction is turned into a meeting. During each
interaction, a random agent and a random neighbor are
chosen to have a meeting. Then, the speaker and the lis-
tener are assigned randomly. Based on the difference
between the speaker’s and the listener’s statuses, we ran-
domly decide whether the meeting occurs.
To decide whether a meeting takes place, we introduce
the Probabilistic Meeting Rule. Basically, the Probabilistic
Meeting Rule is a function that takes the agents’ social
statuses as input and, based on the difference between the
speaker’s and listener’s status, calculates the probability of
the meeting taking place. The rule is defined by the fol-
lowing equation:
psl ¼ min 1; ebðssslÞ
 
; ð1Þ
where ss is the speaker’s status, sl is the listener’s status
and b 0 is the stratification factor. The stratification
factor b, which can be viewed as a measure of confor-
mance to the agent’s social status, is a tuning parameter in
our model. The above equation results in the following
probabilities. If the speaker’s status is higher than the lis-
tener’s status, psl has the value of 1, that is, such a meeting
always takes a place. If the opposite is true, various sce-
narios are possible, depending on the value of the stratifi-
cation factor. For example, b ¼ 0 indicates an
egalitarian society and psl is always equal to 1. However,
if we slowly increase the stratification factor, psl will start
to decay and in general will take a value between 0 and 1,
which signifies a ranked society (see the running example
in Fig. 1). If we continue to increase b, we will soon (be-
cause of the exponential term in the equation) reach a
situation where psl for all practical matters is equal to 0. In
other words, we have reached a stratified society where
meetings take place only if the speaker’s status is higher
than the listener’s status but never in the opposite case.
The application of our Probabilistic Meeting Rule to our
datasets is depicted in Fig. 2. The probability of a meeting
taking place is shown in correlation with the percentage of
pairs of agents participating in that meeting. The above-
mentioned scenarios are represented as follows: egalitar-
ian society (corresponds to b ¼ 0)—green bar (circle
texture), ranked society (e.g., b ¼ 0:0001)—blue bar (line
texture) and stratified society (e.g., b ¼ 1)—red bar (star
texture).
2.3 Estimating stratification factor
In this section, our primary goal is to investigate how the
stratification factor b from Probabilistic Meeting
Rule (Eq.1) can be estimated such that the opinion flow
between different classes of agents can be easily controlled.
We first draw a line in the distribution of agents’ statuses
and separate the agents into two classes: high (agents with
the status above 90th percentile) and low (agents below
90th percentile) class. Our focus lies on the estimation of
the expected meeting probability between low- and high-
status agents. Please note, however, that the methodology
presented here can be applied also in a general setting to
estimate, for example, expected meeting probability
between low-to-low, or high-to-high agents.
The expected meeting probability depends on the dif-
ferences between agents’ social status, which in turn are
random variables with unknown probability density func-
tions. Formally, the problem is to calculate the expectations
of a function (Probabilistic Meeting Rule) of a difference
of two random variables, which are conditioned on their
particular values, that is, they are conditioned on either
being a low or a high agent.
Fig. 2 Naming Game and social status. The application of the
Probabilistic Meeting Rule to our datasets and the emergence of
social classes based on the stratification factor b are illustrated. The
green bar with circle texture indicates an egalitarian society that
corresponds to b ¼ 0, in which each agent can meet every other
agent. With an increase in b, our society becomes more conservative
(as represented with the blue bars with line texture) and becomes a
ranked society. In red bars with circle texture, we observe a two-class
society, that is, a stratified society (color figure online)
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Let X be a random variable (r.v.) representing a user’s
social status. The probability density function (PDF) of the
r.v. X is given with p(x). We define now a new random
variable conditioned on a specific value of that variable xh,
that is, let us consider a random variable U for a low-status
agent and a random variable V for a high-status agent. The
PDF of U is then given by pðuÞ ¼ pðxjx xhÞ and PDF of V
by pðvÞ ¼ pðxjx[ xhÞ. Both of these PDFs can be obtained
by normalizing with a cumulative and complementary
cumulative distribution function evaluated at xh.
To consider the differences between agents’ social sta-
tuses, we would need to define a third r.v. Z ¼ U  V , and
under the assumption that the r.v. U and V are independent,
we could calculate the PDF of Z by calculating the convo-
lution integral for U and V. Finally, we can define the
expected value of ProbabilisticMeetingRule ebz as follows:
E½ebz ¼
Z 1
1
ebz  pðzÞdz ð2Þ
Since in practice none of these steps is tractable for the
analytic solution,we resort to the empirical and approximative
parameter estimation. To that end, we first create an empirical
distribution for the random variable Z. First, we split agents
into two classes: low and high defined by, for example, the
90th percentile (although the choice for xh is in fact arbitrary)
in the distribution of agents’ status values. Second, we iterate
over all the links in the network and keep only low-to-high
pairs to construct an empirical distribution of the differences
between agents’ statuses. Please note that the same procedure
may be repeated for estimation of, for instance, the expected
meeting probability of low-to-low or any other interesting
pairs (instead of keeping low-to-high pairs we just need to
keep the pairs in question). From this distribution, we then
draw a random sample of size N and estimate the expectation
value for ebz by applying the well-known Monte Carlo esti-
mation (Metropolis and Ulam 1949):
E½ebz ¼ 1
N
XN
i¼1
ebzi ð3Þ
Our empirical solution is flexible and can be easily
adapted to consider opinion flow in other agents’ groups
(e.g., high-to-high). By defining the percentage of allowed
opinion flow between agents in different groups, we can
determine b for networks of various structure and scope.
3 Datasets and experiments
3.1 Datasets
In our experiments, we use two types of empirical datasets:
(i) the first one is derived from a Q&A site
(StackExchange1) and (ii) the second one is a co-authorship
dataset introduced in Tang et al. (2008).
In StackExchange, users collaborate, ask questions and
give answers on particular problems. After an iterative
discussion process, users exchange their opinions, find
solutions to a problem and agree on the best suggested
solutions (Tausczik et al. 2014). Such Q&A sites have a
reputation system which rewards users via reputation
scores based on their contributions (Halavais et al. 2014;
Movshovitz-Attias et al. 2013). Based on the policies of
this reputation system, users get appropriate reputation
scores for giving good answers, asking good questions or
voting on questions/answers of other users. It is evident
that high-reputation users contribute high-quality answers
(Movshovitz-Attias et al. 2013). We expect that high-rep-
utation users also demonstrate high convincing power
during the agreement process, influencing opinions of other
(low-reputation) users. In our experiments, we apply rep-
utation scores as a proxy for the social status and these two
terms are used interchangeably throughout the paper. The
StackExchange platform does not indicate associations
between users or friendship links. For that reason, we turn
our attention to collaboration networks which we extract by
analyzing co-posting activities of users in order to have
social ties between them (Adamic and Adar 2001; Halavais
et al. 2014; Tang et al. 2012). In Q&A sites, a co-posting
activity between two users refers to a scenario under which
two users comment on the same post. Thus, if two users
contributed in any way to a same post, they are connected
via an edge in the collaboration network. We analyze the
following StackExchange language datasets: French,
Spanish, Chinese, Japanese, German and English. They are
available for downloading for research purpose from the
StackExchange dataset archive.
We constructed our co-authorship network from the
empirical dataset presented in Tang et al. (2008) that is
freely available under.2 In this co-authorship dataset,
publication data are combined from three different sources:
DBLP, CiteSeer and Google Scholar, and the problem of
the author name disambiguation is addressed properly.
Two authors are connected via an edge in the co-authorship
network if they co-authored at least a publication together.
The dataset provides citation counts for each author, which
is used in our case as a proxy for author’s reputation.
3.2 Datasets statistics
The details of our empirical networks (derived from the
above-mentioned datasets) and their properties are given in
Table 1, with the number of nodes (n), number of edges
1 http://stackexchange.com/.
2 https://aminer.org/DBLP_Citation.
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(m), mean (l), median (l1=2), standard deviation (r) of the
reputation scores, assortativity coefficient (r) and modu-
larity (Q).
Among our StackExchange datasets, the English net-
work is the largest one with 30,656 nodes and
192,983 edges, whereas the French is the smallest one with
1478 nodes and 6668 edges in the network. The German,
Japanese, Chinese and Spanish networks lie in between the
English and French networks in terms of network size. The
co-authorship dataset is much larger in size compared with
all StackExchange datasets; with 1,057,194 nodes and
3,634,124 edges, it constitutes the largest dataset in our
experiments.
The negative assortativity coefficient r in our StackEx-
change datasets indicates a negative correlation (Newman
2003) between reputation scores over the network edges. In
other words, users with lower reputation scores are more
likely to connect to users with higher reputation scores. In
particular, a typical post in our datasets has many users
with low scores (e.g., who post a question) and only a few
or even only a single user with a high score (e.g., who
answers the question). This finding is in line with the
assumptions from the social status theory. The Chinese
network has the lowest absolute assortativity coefficient
among our networks, indicating that in this network there is
a smaller chance of connection with a dissimilar reputation
score. The Japanese and French networks have the highest
absolute assortativity coefficient. The co-authorship dataset
is characterized with a positive assortativity coefficient r,
which is typical for co-authorship networks in general
(Noldus and Mieghem 2015), indicating that, on average,
nodes with similar reputation scores are connected toge-
ther. Particularly, this means that authors having similar
social status in their community tend to publish an article
together.
The modularity score is a measure of strength of the
community structure in a network. A high modularity score
indicates the existence of strong communities in the net-
work, while a low modularity score means that the
community structure is not that strong (Newman 2006). In
our StackExchange networks, we observe low modularity
values corresponding to a very weak or almost nonexistent
community structure. As previously shown in a network
without communities, in general Naming Game converges
quickly to a single opinion (Baronchelli et al. 2006b). In
contrary, our co-authorship network exhibits much higher
modularity value; thus, the community structure in this
network is stronger.
The distribution of reputation scores and node degrees
resembles a heterogenous distribution for all networks,
which indicates that the majority of users in our collabo-
ration networks have low-reputation scores. Figure 3a
shows the English StackExchange network, in which the
correlation between the reputation scores and the node
degrees is a linear correlation with a Pearson correlation
coefficient of 0.88. All other StackExchange datasets have
comparable properties. In the case of the co-authorship
network shown (see Fig. 3b), the Pearson correlation
coefficient between the degree and the reputation score is
0.54. It is evident that there are cases of authors having a
high citation count (used as a proxy for reputation) but low
degree, which indicates that they possess a low number of
co-authored publications that are frequently cited. For
illustration purposes, we further investigated this property
of our co-authorship dataset and retrieved the names of the
authors having a low degree (lower than the 90th per-
centile) and a high citation count (higher than the 90th
percentile). For example, the author Dennis M. Volpano3 is
characterized in our dataset with a degree of 6 and a
citation count of 750. After checking the author’s website
and digital libraries such as IEEE Xplore, it is obvious that
the author published most of his publications as a single
author or in collaboration with other few authors, but his
publications received a considerable attention from the
community and are highly cited. The opposite scenarios are
also possible, which correspond to authors being active in
Table 1 StackExchange and
co-authorship datasets
Dataset Type n m l l1/2 r r Q
StackExch. French 1478 6668 298 111 1273 -0.23 0.31
Spanish 1584 6908 196 101 554 -0.19 0.38
Chinese 1985 8556 160 61 477 -0.15 0.41
Japanese 2069 11,155 328 77 1535 -0.16 0.32
German 2316 12,825 285 103 1219 -0.16 0.32
English 30,656 192, 983 199 48 1654 -0.19 0.33
Co-auth. AMiner 1,057,194 3,634,124 20 2 138 0.15 0.67
Description of StackExchange and co-authorship datasets with the number of nodes (n), number of edges
(m), mean (l), median (l1=2) and standard deviation (r) of the reputation scores, assortativity coefficient
(r) and modularity (Q)
3 http://faculty.nps.edu/volpano/.
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scientific collaboration (high degree), but their publications
have a low citation count.
3.3 Simulations
In our experiments, we simulate Naming Game extended
with the Probabilistic Meeting Rule. The simulation
framework is provided as an open source project.4 Our
experiments consist of the following steps:
1. We calculate the stratification factor b using the
approach from Sect. 2.3, getting the values for the
stratification factor that we need, to reflect a given
situation. For all networks, we define five percentages,
which correspond to the society forms defined earlier
in this paper and control the opinion flow from low- to
high-status agents (i.e., 100 %—egalitarian, 75, 50
and 25 %—ranked and 0 %— stratified society).
2. Each agent’s inventory is initialized with a fixed
number of three opinions (represented through num-
bers from 0 to 99). These opinions are selected
uniformly at random from a bag of opinions to ensure
that each opinion occurs with the same probability.
3. We once create meeting sequences and apply the same
sequences for the different values of stratification
factors. Initialization of agent inventories differs for
each meeting sequence, but same initializations are
used for all b. Hence, it is ensured that the randomness
between b is insignificant, due to the same meeting
sequence and same initialization for different b.
4. For each meeting sequence, depending on the network
size, we define the number of user interactions
(iterations) for the simulations. We perform 4 million
interactions for the largest StackExchange network
(English), 1 million interactions for the five other
StackExchange networks and 20 million interactions
for the co-authorship network.
5. We run 100 simulations per b and report the averaged
simulation results to account for statistical fluctuations
in the simulations.
6. During the simulations, we store important information
such as the appearance of agents as listeners/speakers, their
participation in overall interactions versus successful
meetings and the evolution of the agent’s inventory size.
7. We modify the initialization of the agents’ inventories
to differentiate between opinions assigned to low- and
high-status agents, respectively, in order to evaluate
the final agreement of agents.
4 Results and discussion
Figure 4 summarizes the results of our experiments by
depicting the agent’s inventory size as a function of the
simulation progress for the (a) English StackExchange and
(b) co-authorship networks.
4.1 Inventory size evolution of disassortative
networks
The simulation results among all StackExchange networks
are similar; thus, we show only the results of the largest
Fig. 3 Distribution of reputation scores. Correlation between the
distribution of reputation scores and node degrees for the English
StackExchange network (a) and co-authorship network (b). The
subplots on the right show the heterogenous distribution of reputation
scores in the both networks. The subplots on the top present the
heterogenous distribution of node degrees. In the middle, the scatter
plot of reputation scores versus node degrees is shown. The Pearson
correlation coefficient between degrees and reputation scores is 0.88
for the English StackExchange network. All other StackExchange
datasets have comparable distributions and correlation coefficients. In
the case of the co-authorship network, the Pearson correlation
coefficient between degrees and reputation scores is 0.54. As it can be
seen from the plot in b, it is evident that some authors with a high
citation count have a low degree (i.e., low number of co-authored
publications), but there are also cases of authors with a low citation
count and a high degree (i.e., they are active in scientific collabo-
ration, but their publications have a low citation count)
4 https://github.com/floriangeigl/reputation_networks.
Soc. Netw. Anal. Min.  (2016) 6:80 Page 7 of 17  80 
123
StackExchange network (i.e., English in Fig. 4a). In the
case of egalitarian society (b ¼ 0), the English network
converges to a single opinion. This is in line with the
previous experiments with the Naming Game—in networks
without a strong community structure, we always reach a
consensus. In the case of stratified society, we do not
observe convergence—consensus cannot be reached. This
seems slightly counterintuitive—an intuition would be that
consensus building would benefit from the presence of
agents with a high social status and their influence on
agents with a lower social status.
Finding 1: Opinion dynamics in disassortative col-
laboration networks are aﬀected by the individual’s
social status. If, due to the social status, opinions
ﬂow only in the high-to-low direction, the consensus
building process is disturbed and consensus cannot be
achieved, as opposed to when the status does not play
any role at all.
The simulation results for ranked societies indicate that
the impact of the social status on opinion dynamics is a
complex one. In all our StackExchange networks, we
observe the following situation. By starting at b ¼ 0 and
slowly increasing the stratification factor (note that higher
values of stratification factor successively reduce percent-
ages of meetings between low- and high-status agents), we
are at first still able to reach consensus. Moreover, the
convergence rate increases with a slightly increased strat-
ification factor (cf. Fig. 4a for e.g., ranked 75 %—black
line with triangle marker and ranked 50 %—blue line with
diamond marker). However, by further increasing the
stratification factor, we reach a tipping point after which a
further increase of the stratification factor results firstly in
slower convergence rates before we again reach a state of
no convergence at all (within e.g., stratified society).
Finding 2: The relation between the opinion dynam-
ics and the stratiﬁcation factor of a society in disas-
sortative collaboration networks is intricate. Low val-
ues of stratiﬁcation tend to favor consensus reaching
– in such societies, consensus is always reached at a
very fast convergence rate, which is higher than in
egalitarian societies. However, if the stratiﬁcation fac-
tor becomes too large, the consensus reaching process
is hindered.
4.2 Inventory size evolution of assortative networks
Due to the large size of the co-authorship network, a much
higher number of interactions are needed in order for all
agent pairs to participate at least once in a meeting. For our
experiments, we used 20 million interactions, but if the
number of interactions is further increased the lines in
Fig. 4b will continue to drop toward 1. The co-authorship
(a) (b)
Fig. 4 Inventory size evolution averaged over 100 runs per b. Mean
values of the agent’s inventory size in relation to the number of
interactions for English StackExchange (a) and co-authorship
(b) networks. We compute five b for each network and control the
opinion flow from low- to high-status agents. The green lines in the
plots correspond to egalitarian societies (100 % opinion flow),
whereas the red lines represent the stratified societies (0 % opinion
flow). The lines in between (black, blue and magenta) depict the
ranked societies, in which the opinion flow from low- to high-status
agents is inhibited to 75, 50 and 25 %, respectively. For readability
reasons, error bars representing standard deviation of the mean
agent’s inventory size over 100 runs per b are not depicted in the
plots. In the English StackExchange network (a), in the case of an
egalitarian society a common opinion is reached and the convergence
rate is fast. In a stratified society, the opinions do not converge (the
mean number of opinions lies between 1 and 2). Ranked societies also
reach a common opinion with the highest convergence rate. Thus, for
the English network, the consensus building depends on the status but
in a non-obvious way, indicating that there is a specific setting at
which the influence of the social status reaches the optimal state. In
the case of co-authorship network in b, consensus is reached almost
independently from b, so external interventions (such as our
Probabilistic Meeting Rule) do not influence opinion convergence
rates (color figure online)
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network is characterized with a positive assortativity coef-
ficient that indicates that high-status agents are, on average,
connected to other high-status agents, and low-status agents
are connected to other low-status agents. The number of
connections between low- and high-status agents is low;
therefore, few meetings are taking place between these two
classes. Consensus is reached almost independently from b
(cf. Fig. 4b), so our Probabilistic Meeting Rule does not
benefit faster opinion convergence rates.
Finding 3: If a positive degree assortativity is evident
in the network (e.g., co-authorship network), consen-
sus is reached without external interventions.
4.3 Participation of agents in meetings across status
groups
To further analyze these findings, let us investigate in more
details the direction and intensity of opinions flow in our
disassortative and assortative networks. To that end, we
separate the agents into two classes: high (agents with the
status above 90th percentile) and low (agents below 90th
percentile) class. All reputation distributions are skewed to
right and resemble a heterogenous distribution, and the
division into classes results in a reputation boundary of for
example, 220 for English StackExchange network with all
agents having reputation above 220 belonging to the high
class and all agents below 220 belonging to the low class
(for comparison the highest reputation score in English
dataset is 105,678). All other StackExchange networks are
comparable to English, and our analysis produces similar
results. For that reason, we henceforth discuss only the
English network as an example of our disassortative net-
works. In the case of our assortative network (i.e., co-au-
thorship network), the highest reputation score is 15,758
and the reputation boundary for the 90th percentile is at 27,
indicating that all low-status agents have a reputation score
below 27, while high-status agents possess a reputation
score above 27.
An important question is what happens when agents
interact and how the Probabilistic Meeting Rule evaluates
depending on the classes of agents participating in a
meeting. In other words, we want to investigate the fraction
of interactions that turn into a successful meeting (which
consequently results in an opinion flow and increases the
likelihood of two agents agreeing on a single word). We
therefore classify each interaction according to the agent
classes into four possible pairs: (i) low-to-low, (ii) low-to-
high, (iii) high-to-low and (iv) high-to-high where the first
class corresponds to the speaker’s class and the second
corresponds to the listener class. Figure 5 depicts the
fractions of successful meetings among all interactions in
the English StackExchange and co-authorship networks for
three values of the stratification factor—egalitarian society
(corresponds to b ¼ 0), ranked society (up to 50 % opinion
flow is allowed between low- and high-status agents with
optimal values b ¼ 0:0001 for English and b ¼ 0:005 for
co-authorship network) and stratified society (e.g., b ¼ 1
and b ¼ 5). The only difference between plots in
(a) English (disassortative) and (b) co-authorship (assor-
tative) networks lies on the percentage of meetings taking
place among low-status agents and between low and high
agents. As previously mentioned, the number of physical
connections between low and high agents in the co-au-
thorship network is lower than in StackExchange networks,
and this results to the lower number of meetings taking
place between these two classes. Since, in the co-author-
ship network agents belonging to the same classes tend to
connect together, the number of meetings among low
agents (low-to-low pairs) is much higher compared with
StackExchange networks. The fraction of high-status
agents is equivalent for both networks; thus, the number of
meetings taking place between high-status agents is almost
the same.
In the case of stratified society (red bars with star tex-
ture), opinions flow without restrictions only in high-to-low
direction. Thus, the agents with a higher status can pass
over their opinions to the agents with a lower status. The
flow in the opposite direction is completely prohibited, and
therefore, agents with a lower status cannot influence the
opinions of the agents with a higher status. However, the
Probabilistic Meeting Rule in this case is so strict and
prohibitive that it greatly inhibits the opinion flow within
the agents of the same status (i.e., high-to-high and low-to-
low pairs). Because of the skewed nature of the reputation
distributions, the inhibition in the low-to-low group (which
is considerably larger than the high–high group) is more
severe—the agents with a lower social status cannot effi-
ciently exchange their opinions with each other and must
rely on the agents with a higher social status to inject
opinions into the low group by meeting each low agent
separately. Since there are few high-status and many low-
status agents, consensus is never reached.
On the other hand, in the case of egalitarian society
(green bars with circle texture), opinions flow without any
restrictions in all directions. This results in the convergence
of opinions and a rather fast convergence rate. However,
the convergence rate is slightly slower as compared to the
optimal case (ranked society). In our opinion, the expla-
nation for this phenomenon lies in the dynamics of the low-
to-high group meetings. Since everybody can impose her
opinion onto everybody else, low-status agents very often
change the opinions of high-status agents. Thus, low-status
agents increase the variance in the inventories of high-
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status agents, and they need additional meetings to elimi-
nate these opinions. This results in slower convergence
rates.
A particular dynamics of low-to-high meetings also
explains faster convergence rates in ranked societies (blue
bars with line texture). In this case, the opinion flow from
the agents of low status to the agents of high status is
strongly slowed down. Therefore, the disturbances in the
opinions of high-status agents are not substantial any more.
On the other hand, as opposed to the stratified society, the
opinion flow within the low-to-low group is not impaired at
all. Thus, the injected opinions from the high-status agents
can be diffused among the low-status agents themselves
without need to address each low-status agent separately.
This, combined with the reduced disturbances flowing from
low- to high-status agents, results in optimal opinion con-
vergence rates.
Finding 4: The optimal convergence of opinions is
achieved when low status agents can exchange their
opinions among themselves without any restrictions.
In addition, there must be a barrier that prohibits low
status agents to inﬂict their opinions on high status
agents so that disturbances in the opinions of high
status agents are minimized.
4.4 Agents’ final agreement
In order to gain insights into the final agreement of indi-
viduals, we investigated each of the single opinions that
agents agreed on. So, we modified the initialization of the
agents’ inventories to differentiate between opinions
assigned to low- and high-status agents, respectively. After
rerunning the experiments and evaluating the results, we
found out that for very low stratification factor (corre-
spond to higher percentages of meetings taking place
between low- and high-status agents, e.g., egalitarian,
ranked 75 % and ranked 50 % in Fig. 4) the final agree-
ment of agents is mostly on the opinion of a low-status
agent, whereas for higher stratification factor (e.g.,
ranked 25 % and stratified in Fig. 4) the opinion on which
all agents agreed on is usually one of a high-status agent.
This is in line with the fact that for very low stratification
factor the intensity of the communication from low- to
high-status agents is high, so the probability that an opinion
of a low-status agent is the final opinion on which all
agents agreed on is high. By increasing beta, we decrease
the probability of a communication taking place between
low and high agents. Thus, the final agreement is mostly on
the opinion of a high-status agent.
(a) (b)
Fig. 5 Participation of agents in meetings across status groups. The
percentage of interactions resulting in meetings as a function of
reputation classes in the English StackExchange (a) and co-authorship
network (b). The high class comprises agents with the status above
90th percentile and the low class all other agents. In the stratified so-
ciety (red bars with star texture), a common opinion cannot be
reached because the meeting rule is so strict that even communica-
tions between low agents (low-to-low pairs) are severely impaired. In
the egalitarian society (green bars with circle texture), the conver-
gence is slower because low-status agents disturb high-status agents
by inflicting their opinion upon them (low-to-high pairs). In the
ranked society (blue bars with line texture), the optimal convergence
is achieved because low-status agents can diffuse opinions among
themselves (low-to-low pairs). At the same time, since the commu-
nications between low- and high-status agents are inhibited (low-to-
high pairs), low-status agents’ opinions cannot disturb those of high-
status agents. The only difference between the plots in a and b lies on
the percentage of meetings among low-status agents and between
low- and high-status agents. Since in the co-authorship (assortative)
network, agents belonging to the similar classes tend to connect
together, the number of meetings between low-to-low pairs is higher
than the number of meetings between low-to-high and high-to-low
pairs (color figure online)
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Finding 5: The ﬁnal agreement of agents is mostly
on the opinion of a low status agent, if the opinion
ﬂow from low to high agents is not disturbed at all,
or if it is disturbed up to 50%. By further prohibit-
ing the opinion ﬂow from low to high status agents,
the winning opinion, on which all agents agree on, is
usually one of a high status agent.
5 Analysis of network correlations
In this section, we study how network structure and, in
particular, the correlation of structure and status affect the
process of consensus reaching in collaboration networks by
constructing disassortative and assortative synthetic
networks.
5.1 Decorrelating networks
Our aim is to study in detail how the network structure and,
in particular, the correlation of structure and status affect
the process of consensus reaching in our networks. Obvi-
ously, the connections between hubs and other nodes play a
crucial role, as well as the distribution of degree sequence
and the position of high-reputation nodes in the network.
For this study, we generated specific synthetic networks,
whereas in each case, only one particular property of
interest is preserved while others are eliminated. This way,
in each experiment, we can assess the influence of a single
property on the overall opinion dynamics process.
5.1.1 Degree and status correlation
In order to analyze the role of network structure and
especially the role of the degree assortativity on the process
of opinion spreading, we generate three synthetic networks
based on the original collaboration networks introduced in
Sect. 3. All synthetic networks have the same number of
nodes n and edges m as the empirical networks, but we
modify the connections between nodes and the correlation
between degree and reputation as follows:
Random
network
Here, we rewire the edges uniformly at
random. This means that all nodes have
equal probability of getting selected for
creating an edge. The resulting network
corresponds to the Erd}os–Re´nyi model
proposed in Erdo¨s and Re´nyi (1959), and
its node degree distribution follows a
homogeneous Poisson distribution. With
this network, we eliminate the degree
sequence and the correlation with
reputations.
Configuration
model
In this case, the edges from the original
network are randomly rewired, but the
degree sequence remains the same
(Bender and Canfield 1978; Molloy and
Reed 1995). An uncorrelated rewiring
minimizes the bias for connections in a
network as all nodes are randomly
rewired to different nodes than in the
original network. Since the degree
sequence is not modified, this results in a
heterogeneous degree distribution with
the same slope as in the original network.
With this network, we eliminate the
correlation between nodes over the edges,
for example, we eliminate the
correlations caused by the friendship
relations.
Shuffled
reputations
Finally, we do not modify the network
structure itself, but shuffle the reputation
of nodes randomly. In the resulting
network, the node degrees are
decorrelated with reputations.
For all the experiments in the synthetic networks, we use as
basis the English StackExchange and the co-authorship data-
sets and we follow the experimental setup described in Sect. 3.
5.2 Results of decorrelated networks
Our experimental results reveal some interesting insights.
In Fig. 6, we show the evolution of agent’s inventory size
during the interactions, averaged over 100 runs. To better
understand the variation of the stochastic processes per-
formed throughout our simulations, we calculated standard
deviations over 100 runs per b, but for readability reasons,
we removed error bars from the plots. Typical standard
deviation values range between 0.48 (e.g., English shuffled
reputations network) and 0.66 (English Erd}os–Re´nyi net-
work). Table 2 summarizes the results of our experiments
both on empirical and decorrelated networks.
5.2.1 Disassortative networks
We recall the results of the original English network once
more for an easier comparison with the results with syn-
thetic networks. The simulation results with the English
StackExchange original networks show that the
ranked societies reach a common opinion with the highest
convergence rate, higher than in egalitarian societies (e.g.,
ranked 50 % compared to egalitarian in Fig. 4), whereas
in a stratified society consensus is not reached at all.
The simulation results for the English Erd}os–Re´nyi
network differ from the original network (see Fig. 6a).
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Except for stratified society, for which consensus is not
reached within the limit of interactions, for other societies,
the process of consensus reaching is slowed down. The
fastest convergence is achieved with b ¼ 0, respectively, in
egalitarian societies. This result shows that the conver-
gence rate is highly dependent on the existence of hubs in a
network. In an Erd}os–Re´nyi network, the high-status
agents are not hubs any more since their degrees are much
smaller and therefore they cannot spread their opinions to
low-status agents as quickly as in the original network.
We find a further evidence for this behavior in the
English configuration model in which the calculated strat-
ification factors and the evolution of agent’s inventory size
are identical to the original network; thus, the
figure presenting the results is not included. In this exam-
ple, we keep the same degree sequence but rewire the
edges in the English StackExchange network. Since we
now keep the hubs and the degree–status correlation, we do
not disturb the consensus reaching process. We simply
reconnect the low-degree/low-status agents to different
high-degree/high-status agents. This result also shows that
additional external correlations such as friendship/collab-
oration correlations do not influence the consensus reach-
ing. Mainly, it is the degree/status correlation that provides
support for achieving the consensus.
In the English network with shuffled reputations
(Fig. 6b), the estimated stratification factors that define the
five societies are identical to the English Erd}os–Re´nyi
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 6 Decorrelating networks. Mean values of the agent’s inventory
size in relation to the number of interactions for English Erd}os–Re´nyi
(a), English shuffled reputations (b), co-authorship Erd}os–Re´nyi
(c) and co-authorship configuration model (d) networks. The process
of consensus building varies among networks. In the English Erd}os–
Re´nyi network, the process of consensus reaching is slowed down,
whereas in the English shuffled reputations, the opinion convergence
rate is faster (agents agree to a common opinion almost independently
from b). In the English configuration model, opinions converge with
the highest rates in the case of ranked societies (e.g., ranked 50 %),
which corresponds to the English original network; thus, the plot is
omitted. In the co-authorship Erd}os–Re´nyi and configuration model,
the consensus building process is slowed down compared with the co-
authorship original network. The simulation results of the co-
authorship shuffled reputations network are identical with the original
co-authorship network; consequently, it is not included in the figure
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network. However, agents agree to a common opinion
almost independently from the society form, except for the
stratified society. The convergence rate is faster than in
English Erd}os–Re´nyi network. This outcome indicates that
in networks with heterogenous degree distribution and
uncorrelated reputations of users, consensus is reached
automatically without need for external interventions.
Since, however, in most of empirical collaboration net-
works degree strongly correlates with user reputation, we
need another mechanism that can positively influence
opinion dynamics. That mechanism includes controlling
the communication between low- and high-status nodes
through the stratification factor.
5.2.2 Assortative networks
Figure 6c shows the simulation results of the co-authorship
Erd}os–Re´nyi network, in which the hubs are removed. The
calculated b differs from the empirical co-authorship net-
work and the consensus reaching process is slowed down in
this case. This outcome confirms once more that the
presence of hubs is crucial for the consensus reaching
process.
Applying the configuration model to the co-authorship
network while keeping the degree sequence changes the
connection patterns between nodes. So, rewiring the edges
reduces the number of high-to-high and low-to-low con-
nections, simultaneously increasing the number of high-to-
low links. This results in a decreased assortativity. In fact,
in the configuration model, we measure the assortativity
coefficient of 0.0001, whereas in the original co-authorship
network that factor is 0.15. This is shown also in Fig. 6d,
where the opinion convergence rates are slowed down.
Shuffling the reputations in the co-authorship network
does not impact the simulation results as they are identical
with the empirical co-authorship network. Thus, the
respective plot is omitted from Fig. 6.
5.2.3 Distribution of status differences
To further quantify our findings, we investigated the dis-
tribution of status differences between two connected
nodes in our networks. The differences are calculated for
two neighboring nodes if one of the nodes is a low and the
other one is a high-status node (defined by the 90th per-
centile). The results for disassortative and assortative net-
works are depicted in Fig. 7.
In the networks with a heterogenous degree distribution,
a negative degree assortativity and a strong correlation
between degree and status (red and green lines in Fig. 7a),
there are many connections from low- to high-status nodes
and therefore we frequently observe high negative differ-
ences. In other words, there are many potential meetings
between low and high agents that given that they take place
often can disturb the high-status agents and consequently
the consensus reaching process. Thus, to reduce the number
of meetings that take place we need to apply a mechanism
such as our Probabilistic Meeting Rule and inhibit the
opinion flow in the low-to-high direction.
In the case of the English Erd}os–Re´nyi network (blue
line in Fig. 7a), there are lower differences between low-
and high-status agents (the majority of differences is close
to 0), due to the lower number of connections between
these two groups of agents. Thus, not many of the meetings
that take place are high-to-low agent meetings and addi-
tionally with our Probabilistic Meeting Rule, we are also
Table 2 Summary of our findings
Network Type Egalitarian Ranked 75 % Ranked 50 % Ranked 25 % Stratified
Disassortative English
StackExch.
Empirical Converge Converge Fastest
convergence
No converge No converge
Erd}os–Re´nyi Fastest
convergence
Slowed down Slowed down Slowed down no converge
Configuration
model
Converge Converge Fastest
convergence
No converge No converge
Shuffled
reputations
Converge Converge Converge Converge No converge
Assortative co-authorship Empirical Converge Converge Converge Converge Converge
Erd}os–Re´nyi Slowed down Slowed down Slowed down Slowed down Slowed
down
Configuration
model
Slowed down Slowed down Slowed down Slowed down Slowed
down
Shuffled
reputations
Converge Converge Converge Converge Converge
Table summarizing the results of our work
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prohibiting the opinion flow from low- to low-status
agents. Consequently, this slows down the consensus
reaching process.
In the English shuffled reputation network, the number
of connections between low- and high-status agents is the
same as in the original network, but the differences
between agents’ statuses are lower (with only one peak
close to 0, thus, it is omitted in Fig. 7a), which speeds up
the consensus reaching even without external interventions
such as Probabilistic Meeting Rule.
In Fig. 7b, it is shown that, in general, there are lower
differences between agents’ statuses in the co-authorship
empirical network and synthetic networks derived from it,
which explains the fact that in co-authorship original net-
work consensus is reached fast and independent from b.
The opinion convergence rates are slowed down only if the
presence of hubs is lower or if the degree assortativity is
decreased.
Finding 6: A common opinion is adopted in collab-
oration networks with heterogenous degree distribu-
tion. Hubs are key to reaching consensus since they
can distribute a single common opinion to a high
number of other nodes. If degree and status are not
correlated or if a positive degree assortativity is ev-
ident in the network (co-authorship network), con-
sensus is reached quickly and without external in-
terventions. In disassortative networks, where degree
strongly correlates with status (StackExchange em-
pirical networks), this correlation slows down the con-
vergence rate, making it necessary to take actions such
as applying the Probabilistic Meeting Rule to insert
a social barrier between low and high status agents.
6 Related work
At present, we identify three main lines of research related
to our work: opinion dynamics, social status theory and
naming game.
6.1 Opinion dynamics
Opinion dynamics is a process characterized with a group
of individuals reaching a consensus (i.e., the majority of a
group share the same opinion). In opinion dynamics, the
focus is on modeling the opinion state of an individual in
particular and a population in general. Opinion dynamics
has been tackled in the past in the context of statistical
physics (Castellano et al. 2009; Iniguez et al. 2014). As
discussed in Castellano et al. (2009), if opinion dynamics
is viewed from a perspective of statistical physics, an
individual is analogous to a particle with properties that
may or may not change over a period of time. Thus, the
social process of interaction among individuals can be
designed as a mathematical model that represents a change
in the local and global state of an individual and a group.
One of the examples of such a process is the Naming Game
model, a variant of which we are using in our work, that
models how individuals behave during a meeting and
exchange their opinions. In our experiments, the meeting
(a)
(b)
Fig. 7 Kernel density estimation of the distribution of status
differences between low and high agents. Disassortative networks
are shown in a and assortative networks in b. The distribution of
agents’ status differences in the English StackExchange and config-
uration model networks in a are almost identical; thus, the blue and
the red lines overlap. Due to many connections from low- to high-
status agents, we frequently see high negative differences. In the
English Erd}os–Re´nyi network (blue line), the majority of differences
between low- and high-status agents is close to 0, because of the
lower number of connections between these two groups of agents.
The English shuffled reputations network is not shown in the plot,
because of very-low-status differences with only one peak around 0.
In b are shown lower differences between agents’ statuses in the co-
authorship empirical network and synthetic networks (color
figure online)
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process is further enhanced by taking reputation scores of
individuals into account. Constraining the system to favor
high-reputation nodes resulted in reaching consensus later
as compared to an unconstrained model.
In a different context opinion, dynamics is studied in
Blondel et al. (2010), Hegselmann and Krause (2002),
Krause (2011), Lorenz (2007) and Muller (2006), where an
opinion is represented as a real number and a classical
approach of individual opinion formation involves aver-
aging over opinions of other agents in the system. In such a
setting, a consensus is considered to be reached if all the
agents in the system agree to the same value of opinion.
The process of opinion dynamics is studied in Krause
(2011) from both the local and global perspective. They
defined the opinion formation process as local when a user
takes into account only the nearest neighbors, whereas in
the case of global opinion formation the user takes into
account all other agents in the network. The process of
opinion formation is studied in Blondel et al. (2010) by
means of a continuous time multi-agent system. In their
work, they proved that opinion converge to a set of clus-
ters, where agents in each of the cluster share a common
value. Lorenz (2007) studied a continuous model of opin-
ion dynamics under bounded condition. The bounded
condition restricts users to interact with their peers only if
they are close to each other. Such a process of opinion
dynamics leads to formation of clusters with characteristic
location and size patterns. They found the drifting phe-
nomenon in composition of cluster in case of heteroge-
neous bounds. Muller (2006) studied the process of internal
organization within communities of practice and how such
a process leads to some members obtaining a leadership
status. They developed a model to depict the self-orga-
nizing process and found that leaders are the members who
correspond to higher level of activity in the community.
6.2 Social status theory
Research on how the position and status of a node influence
a network is mostly carried out in the context of network
exchange theory (Markovsky et al. 1993; Walker et al.
2000; Willer 1999). This theory states that connections and
a position in a network lead to a power condition that is
based on how the nodes are connected and which position
they take in the network (Walker et al. 2000). For example,
in Markovsky et al. (1993), researchers differentiate
between weak and strong powers network in terms of node
positions and network properties. The authors give a the-
oretical extension to the network exchange theory to
explain why in sparsely connected networks a stronger
power effect is observed than in densely connected net-
works. They found that in densely connected networks,
weak position nodes have an advantage since they have a
higher connectivity, which enables them to short circuit the
structural advantages of strong position nodes. This is
related to our work, as we concentrate on investigating how
the reputation of a node in a network affects the spread of
opinion that leads to establishing consensus in the network.
Also, we define various classes of nodes based on reputa-
tion and determined how their interaction affects their
overall process of consensus building.
6.3 Naming Game
The Naming Game has been introduced in the context of
linguistics (Dall’Asta et al. 2006b) and the emergence of a
shared vocabulary among agents (Baronchelli et al. 2006b)
with the aim to demonstrate how autonomous agents can
achieve a global agreement through pairwise communica-
tions without central coordination (Zhang et al. 2014).
With that regard, we present a selection of variations of the
Naming Game that are relevant to our work.
Similarly to our approach, the work of Brigatti (2008)
describes a variation of the Naming Game that incorporates
the agents’ reputation scores. In the beginning, reputation
is randomly distributed (Gaussian distribution) among the
agents. Successful communication increases the agents’
reputation, and during each iteration, the agent with a
higher reputation score acts as a teacher and the one with
the lower score as a learner. The main difference from our
work is that in Brigatti (2008), they use synthetic data for
the simulations and that the assigned reputation scores are
random numbers that change during iterations. In our work,
we employed empirical collaboration networks from
StackExchange with reputation scores that were assigned
by the community. As opposed to the work of Brigatti
(2008) where there is an open-ended game with unlimited
number of words, the inventory of our agents consists of
predefined sets of three opinions.
Other examples for the Naming Game variations include
the works of Liu et al. (2011), who studied the impact of
spatial structures (e.g., geographical distances) have on
meetings between individuals in a network, and Yang et al.
(2008), who proposed a Naming Game that follows an
asymmetric negotiation strategy and investigated the
influence of hub effects on the agreement dynamics with
specific focus on how quickly consensus could be
achieved. Each agent in the network is assigned a weight
defined by the agent’s degree and a tuneable parameter a.
During iteration, two nodes are randomly selected and
based on their degree and the configuration of the param-
eter a, they are either the speaker or the listener (i.e., if
a[ 0, high-degree agents have more chances to be
speakers and vice versa). This way, the dynamics of the
game can be investigated in light of the varying influence
of high-degree agents. Our work is somewhat related as we
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also use a parameterized probability function to define the
probability of a meeting taking place between two nodes,
in our case depending on their reputation score. The main
difference to our work is that agents’ selection is unbiased
and empirical data with explicitly provided reputation
scores are used.
The diffusion of opinions across networks and the
potential of reaching consensus are strongly influenced by
the availability of communities and, specifically, by the
presence of strong community boundaries (Lu et al. 2009).
To investigate this effect, Lu et al. (2009) assigned a group
of nodes in a network as a committed fraction, that is,
nodes that are not influenced by other nodes in a network
and do not ever change their opinion. In our dataset,
however, no strong community structures are present.
7 Conclusion and future work
Understanding opinion dynamics and how consensus is
reached in social networks has been an open and complex
challenge in our community for years. In this work, we
addressed a subproblem related to this challenge by
investigating a specific case of collaboration networks in
which individual nodes have a certain social status.
To that end, we presented an extension (Probabilistic
Meeting Rule) to the standard Naming Game model of
opinion dynamics. We evaluated our approach on six large
empirical collaboration networks, as well as on three
specifically created synthetic networks, which reflected the
characteristics of the empiric networks. In this work, we
provided a computational approach for the general esti-
mation of the stratification factor of our Probabilistic
Meeting Rule and we analyzed the role network structure
plays in the process of consensus building. These studies
constitute the methodological contribution of our work to
the field of opinion dynamics. Additionally, we investi-
gated various real-world scenarios such as the emergence
and disappearance of social classes in collaboration net-
works. From the empirical point of view, our investigations
revealed insights about the influence of social status on the
diffusion of opinions. Our main finding indicates that social
status strongly influences the opinion dynamics in a com-
plex and intricate way. More specifically, weakly stratified
societies reach consensus at the highest convergence rate,
whereas completely stratified societies do not reach con-
sensus at all. The most important issue in this process is
related to low-status agents and how their communication
is controlled. In particular, the optimal convergence is
achieved when (i) low-status agents are allowed to freely
exchange opinions between themselves (since this reduces
the need for high-status agents to interact with low-status
agents) and (ii) simultaneously there is a communication
barrier reducing the number of interactions of low-status
agents toward high-status agents (since this reduces the
variance in opinions of high-status agents). Furthermore,
our investigations on the role of the network structure
reveal that hubs are in general crucial to reach consensus,
since they can spread a single common opinion to a high
number of nodes. In assortative networks, in which con-
nections between low and high agents are very rare,
external interventions do not benefit faster convergence
rates. A similar situation is observed in disassortative
networks when degree is not correlated with a user’s status.
If there is a strong correlation between status and degree in
a disassortative network, this slows down the convergence
rate, making it necessary to take actions such as applying
the Probabilistic Meeting Rule to disturb the communica-
tion between low- and high-status users.
7.1 Limitations
In our opinion, our work has the following limitations.
Firstly, we represent social status with a single number—
for certain scenarios this representation may be too sim-
plistic. For example, people often play different roles in
social networks and a non-simple interplay between the
roles and status may exist. Secondly, a more finely grained
classification of agents into various groups (e.g., low, mid
and high groups or even finer divisions) may shed more
light on the opinion dynamics. Finally, in our work, we
consider only static snapshots of networks and reputation
scores. However, not only opinions but also networks are
dynamic, as new agents may arrive to the network, new
edges may form and inactive edges may disappear from the
network. Moreover, reputation itself is very dynamic and
depends on the agent’s activity and the current perception
of an agent by her peers.
7.2 Future work
In our future work, we plan to address some of the limi-
tations of our current work and extend our approach and
experiments to other scenarios. For example, one interest-
ing avenue for further research are the networks with a
strong community structure. As communities tend to slow
down the consensus reaching process, it would be inter-
esting to investigate how status and/or network structure
can be adjusted to support the process. Apart from social
status, the influence of trust is of utmost importance in
various social systems and in particular in social media.
Thus, adapting the presented approach to analyzing how
trust relates to opinion dynamics is another promising
research direction for the future.
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